Iw on'td efend this viewb ecause, as explained below, the word "consciousness" is associated with too manym uddled ideas for anys uch statement to be worth defending. Instead, I'll propose a different approach, from an engineering standpoint (Dennett's' design stance', Dennett 1978) . This views humans (and other animals) as having a complexa nd sophisticated design (which is not to say that there'sa ny designer), and attempts to consider howo ne might makes omething with similar capabilities. Design provision must be made for "consciousness", "awareness" etc. (See also Dennett 1983) Unfortunately it is not at all clear what this means. Because "consciousness" is ill-defined, Ve lmans says '...it is consciousness in the sense of "awareness" that is of primary concern'. Is "awareness" anyc learer? Is the fly aware of my approaching hand? Is a dreamer aware of the pain, or the pursuing lion? Most people say: "Yes, that'sw hy dreams are nice, or frightening." Others might think you can'tbeaware (= conscious) when you are asleep (= unconscious). Is the sleepwalker aware of the door-handle when he looks at it and turns it? We are all aware that the end of the century is approaching. If this is included in 'the sense of "awareness"' then consciousness includes nearly everything we know. Where are the boundaries?
Ve lmans is apparently mainly concerned with self aw areness, i.e. inwardly perceiving one's internal states and processes. (Perceiving them, not just knowing about them?) There are many situations in which we are self-conscious or self-aware in some way.But not throughout waking life: when you are totally absorbed in something outside you, e.g. watching an exciting football match, or a gripping play,doyou then lack "first-person" consciousness?
Conjecture: people who discuss consciousness delude themselves in thinking that they knoww hat theya re talking about. I don'tc laim that there is nothing theya re talking about. Rather,i ti sn ot just one thing, but manyd ifferent things muddled together.T hat colloquial language uses one noun is no more evidence for a unique reference than the multifarious uses of the word "energy" (intellectual energy,music with energy,high energy explosion, etc.) Whynot, likephysicists, ignore colloquial usage and agree on some technical definition of the word "consciousness"? Partly because there is also considerable emotional energy associated with the word, which will interfere with serious usage of anyt echnical homonym. More important, we don'ty et have ana dequate understanding of the issues: Wed on'tk noww hat the relevant capabilities of human beings and other animals are; we don'tk noww hat functional decomposition (i.e. what sort of architecture) underlies these abilities, and we don'tk noww hat sorts of mechanisms (electrical, chemical, neuronal, software, or whatever) are capable of producing such functionality.
Claiming to knoww hat consciousness is by attending to it is no more convincing than claiming to knoww hat spatial locations are by attending to them. It didn'th elp Newton. Attending doesn'ta nswer questions about identity: "When is another thing the same place (or mental state) as the one attended to?" has different answers depending on what relationships are in question. A fly,am ouse and a person may all be aware of a moving object: Is that the same state?
There'snoanswer because there'snothing unique that you have and others definitely do or do not have.Iamnot denying the existence of what'sattended to --just its unique identification. Yo ur state is very complexa nd other things may have states that are partly similar,p artly different. But in what ways? Howm anyd ifferent substates underlie "conscious" states? What feels likes omething simple that is either present or absent, is actually something complex, aspects of which may be present or absent in different combinations.
If we give upt he idea of a unique referent, we can instead survey relevant phenomena, analyse their relationships to other capabilities, and then attempt to come up with explanatory designs: a hard task. Psychologists, philosophers, linguists, anthropologists, hypnotists, artists, and others can explore, survey,a nd summarise the manya nd varied phenomena. Cognitive designers can work both bottom-up trying to extend existing computational models and topdown, trying to produce detailed requirements analyses and design specifications for systems with human-likec apabilities. Then, after analysing the design-tradeoffs, we can try devising mechanisms capable of generating all these capabilities, including self-monitoring capabilities.
An architecture that supports not only the perception of external events but also the monitoring of relatively global and abstract internal states could have a number of features consistent with the data reported by Velmans.
If sensory mechanisms monitoring the environment can themselves be monitored, there will be a delay between the occurrence of the first-order perceptual processes and the results of second-order monitoring, just as there is a delay between retinal events and the production of information about the environment. Moreover, self-perception, likea ll perception, will involve errors, loss of information, distortion, and so on.
Similarly,s ome designs support the ability to monitor "control processes" that take decisions, form plans, initiate actions. Again one can expect delay between the occurrence of the first-order internal events and the production of high levels ummary information about those ev ents, and perhaps also some distortions and errors.
It is not surprising that results of monitoring that occur after the events monitored cannot be causally involved in their production, butt heyc an still have a causal role: informing others, keeping records of internal processes for manyp urposes, including long-term feedback that revises strategies used in first-order processes. Experiments showing that some kinds of learning occur without high levelself-monitoring do not imply that all do.
Another second-order process is high leveld ecision making. The various subsystems that produce or control actions of various sorts may themselves be subject to "meta-level" control. Manyparts of the system will normally chug along on the basis of information available to them. But some mechanism is required for coping with conflicting needs and for high-levell ong-term coordination and strategy formation.
This might use a "democratic" voting system with numerical summation and comparison procedures (e.g. in neural nets). Alternatively,h igh-levels trategy formation and conflict resolution might be reserved for a special subsystem with access to more information and more powerful reasoning capabilities than the others (Sloman 1978) . Mixed modes of global control are also possible.
Training could also use second-order processes. Manyskills require low-levelmechanisms to be trained by being taken through various steps in a complexp rocess, with fine-tuning based on feedback (e.g. learning to drive a car,p lay the violin, pronounce words). This might use a mechanism that does partial analyses of the steps required, then guides the lower levels through those steps, and increasingly lets them takec ontrol. Internal monitoring of the behaviour of second (or higher) order control facilities would require yet another mechanism, alongside those monitoring perceptual processing.
These are but hints at the manyand varied ways different levels of monitoring and control may coexist in intelligent agents: some mechanisms controlling others, some monitoring others, some training others, some resolving conflicts between others. Perhaps this somehowp roduces the illusion that there is one high levelprocess in charge of and monitoring everything.
Conjecture: This (very difficult) design-based strategy for explaining phenomena that would support talk of consciousness will eventually explain it all. Wes hall have evidence of success if intelligent machines of the future reject our explanations of howt heyw ork, saying it leaveso ut something terribly important, something that can only be described from the firstmachine point of view.
